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NOTES
THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO DECLARE PEACE.*
"It should be more easy to get out of war than into it."
M. ELLSWORTH in the Constitutional Convention.
International lawyers are not in agreement on the question
as to whether a treaty of peace is necessary to establish a state
of peace, after two or more nations have been at war. The
following authorities hold that a treaty of peace is necessary:
Fiore,' Lawrence, 2 Bluntsehli,5 Pomeroy 4 and Rivier.5 On the
*This article constitutes one chapter of a book to be published
under the general caption, "War and the Constitution."IFiore, Pasquale, International Law codified see 1953-1955-1961.2 Lawrence, T. J., Principles of International Law, sec. 217.
2 Bluntschli, 3. C., Das Moderne Volkerrecht, see. 703.
4 Pomeroy, J. N., International Law, see. 272.
5 Rivier, A., Lehrbuch des Volkerrechts, sec. 69.
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other hand, Phillimore, 6 Oppenheim, 7 Heffter,s Seward, 9 Vattel' °
and Hall" hold that a treaty of peace is not absolutely neces-
sary to establish a state of peace.
Oppenheim points out that war may be terminated in three
different ways; 1, a belligerent may end the war thr. subjuga-
tion of his adversary, 2, the belligerents may abstain from
further acts of war and glide into peaceful relations without
expressly making peace thru a special treaty and 3, the belliger-
ents may formally establish the condition of peace thru a special
treaty of peace, 12
In modern times, at least, illustrations of the first are rare.
Under the second, the parties remain in a condition of uncer-
tainty and where the stakes of war are large, this method is
seldom resorted to. Prof. Charles C. Tansill has listed seventeen
wars that have been terminated by a mere cessation of hostili-
ties.' 3 In cases of this sort it is a moot question as to what
period of suspension of war is necessary to justify the presump-
tion of the restoration of peace. No definite rule has been agreed
upon. In every case this must be determined with reference to
collateral facts and circumstances.' 4
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that there is a lack
of agreement from the international law standpoint as to the
steps that are necessary to establish a state of peace. When we
consider the question from the standpoint of American constitu-
tional law in connection with the operation of our government,
under a written constitution, the difficulties of reaching a cor-
0 Phillimore, Sir Robert., International Law, part 12 C. 1, Par. 510-
11.
O 0ppenheim, L., International Law, sec. 261-262.
"Heffter, A. W., Das Europaische Volkerrecht der Gegenwart, sec.
177.
, Seward, Sec. of State to Mr. Qoni, Spanish minister, July 9, 1868,
U. S. Dip. Corres. 1868, 11-32-34.
" Vattel, I1. de, Law of Nations, Book IV c. II, sec. 11.
nHall, W. E., A treatise on International Law, III, c. IX.
1Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 2, p. 322.
"Sweden and Poland 1716; France and Spain 1717; Russia and
Persia, 1801; Spain and Mexico, 1810; Spain and Chile, 1810; Spain
and Boliva, 1810; Spain and Costa Rico, 1910; Spain and Guatemala,
1810; Spain and Salvador, 1810; Spain and Columbia, 1810; Spain and
Honduras, 1810; Spain and Paraguay, 1810; Spain and Ecuador, 1810;
Mexico and Texas, 1836; France and Mexico, 1861; Prussia and Lich-
enstein, 1866 and Spain and Peru, Chile, Boliva and Ecuador, 1864;
(Chas. C. Tansill, Leg, Ref. division, "Termination of wars by mere
cessation of hostilities," Library of Congress).
"Seward, Sec. of State, Dip. Corres, 1868, Vol. 2, p. 32-34.
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rect decision are greatly increased. At the outset, it should
be emphasized that the Constitution of the United States con-
tains no specific grant of power to any branch of the govern-
ment to make peace. Art. 1, see. 8, Clause 11, confers on Con-
gress the power to declare war. Is it to be implied that Con-
gress by a repeal of the declaration of war, can establish a state
of peace? Art. 2, sec. 2, Clause 2, confers on the President and
the Senate the treaty power. Is it to be implied, that a state of
peace can be established only by treaty?
If we examine the American practice, we shall find that of
our five foreign wars, four were concluded by treaty and, one
by joint resolution. The Revolutionary War was terminated
by the Treaty of Paris, September 3, 1783; The War of 1812 by
the Treaty of Ghent, December 24, 1814; The Mexican War by
the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of Pebruary 3, 1848, the
Spanish American War by the treaty of Paris, December 10,
1898 and the World War by the Knox Resolution of July 2,
1921.
If we examine the authorities, we find hopeless confusion.
John Randolph Tucker apparently supports both positions, and
he has been quoted by partisans on both sides. At one time
he said, "Congress cannot create the status of peace by repeal-
ing its declaration of war, because the former requires the con-
currence of two wills, the latter but the action of one.'"'1 But
he also said, "Is there no end to the war except at the will of
the President and Senate? No authority can be cited on the
question but the writer thinks a repeal of a law requiring
war would be effectual to bring about the status of peace in
place of war."' 1  The apparent contradiction can be remioved
by an analysis of the contexts. In the first case Mr. Tucker is
speaking of a negotiated peace and obviously Congress has no
means of carrying on pourparlers directly with a foreign gov-
ernment. In the second case, he no doubt refers to a mere
legal termination of hostilities which he believes Congress can
bring about, with a treaty to follow made by the President and
the Senate.
Senator Knox on May 5, 192017 presented an elaborate
mQuoted in H. ST. G. Tucker, Limitations on the Treaty Making
Power, p. 357.
Tucker, The Constitution of the 'United States, II, 718.
'
TCong. Rec. Vol. 59, part 7, Pp. 6556-66.
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argument to the effect that Congress could by joint resolution
terminate the war with Germany and establish a state of peace.
He considered the problem from two aspects, the domestic and
the international. We shall attempt to briefly summarize his
position. Senator Knox contends (1) that "war is a state or
condition of governments contending by force";18 that is to
say, war is actual hostilities. It has been so construed by the
Supreme court 19 and by the War Department. (2) The power
to declare war is in Congress, which created the status of war
by a law which like any other law can be amended, modified or
repealed. (3) The purpose of the war powers of the Constitu-
tion is to give the government the legal power and the practic-
able ability to conduct actual hostilities. (4) The war powers
cannot be exercised BEFORE a war is legally declared or DE
FACTO existing, nor AFTER actual hostilities have ceased.
(5) C. J. Chase in Ex parte AMligan 20 speaking for himself,
and Justices Wayne, Swayne and Miller said, "We by no means
assert that Congress can establish and apply the laws of war
where no war has been declared or exists, where peace exists, the
laws of peace must prevail." (6) The very fact of ending hos-
tilities, ended the war powers without any action whatever by
Congress. Domestically, the war powers ceased with the end
of hostilities. More than seventeen months have elapsed since
the last shot was fired in the World War.
Internationally, (1) the war is at an end by virtue of the
Armistice. The Armistice was in reality a surrender, a capitula-
tion. Its terms do not look toward a temporary suspension of
hostilities. It is an armistice in name only; (2) the war is at
an end by the "silent cessation" of hostilities which concluded
the war in fact. (3) Our late allies and associates claim that
we are at peace. Our erstwhile enemies admit it. (4) The
Imperial German Government has ceased to exist and it is well
understood that we "have no quqarrel with the German Peoples."
Hence we are at peace internationally.
Then Senator Knox goes on to say that the President con-
tinues to declare that we are at war, but that as a practical
matter the only war he wages is a war against American citizens
and American industry. Hence he urges the passing of the
2 Westlake, International Law, 1.
The Eliza, 4 Dallas, 40-1800, The Amelia, 1 Cranch 28-1861.
"G4 Wallace 2.
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formal resolution. The Knox Peace Resolution expressly refers
to the declaration of April 6, 1917, to the effect that "a state
of war existed" and then states "that said state of war is hereby
declared at an end." Congress passed the Resolution May 21,
1920. It was vetoed by President Wilson on May 27, 1920. In
July 1921, Congress passed another Joint Resolution declaring
peace and President Harding signed it on July 2, 1921. The
latter resolution did not expressly repeal the war declaration
but merely announced that such state of war was "hereby de-
clared at an end."
The debates in the House of Representatives on the Knox
Resolution from April 6 to April 10, 1920, throw some light21
on the power of Congress to declare peace. Those who believed
that Congress had the power to terminate the World War and
establish a state of peace argued that in the absence of specific
withholding of power by the Constitution, Congress possesses
the broad authority to legislate and to provide for the general
welfare, especially under the condition existing, where the other
branches of the government failed to function. It was con-
tended that if the Constitution is not interpreted in a liberal way
in emergencies like this, the governmental system will become
unworlable. 22 Air. Kreider 23 pointed out that in the Trading
with the Enemy Act, Congress had authorized the President to
end the war by proclamation, and if Congress can authorize a
declaration of peace, it can also enunciate peace itself. Mr.
Newton 24 argued that if Congress has no authority in this
matter, the United States in case of a stubborn President might
remain at war for years against the desire of the nation. Mr.
Rogers contended that in the absence of express Constitutional
prohibition it follows by necessary implication that the grant
of power to declare war carries with it the power to end war.25
Those favoring the Knox Resolution argued generally that Con-
gress should have the right to say "we have quit fighting" and
to state the conditions upon which trade might be resumed with
the German people.
A favorite quotation for the advocates of Congressional
2 Debates in Congress, April 6 to 9th, 1920, Cong. Record.
= Mr. Evans of Nebraska, Apr. 9, 1920, p. 5854, Cong. Record.
" April 9, 1920, p. 5846, Cong. Record.
"April 8, 1920, p. 5788, Cong. Record.
3OApr. 8, 1920, p. 5779, Cong. Record.
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power is to be found in the Opinions of Attorney General .2
It reads, "The power to declare war undoubtedly includes, not
only the right to commence war, but to recognize its existence
when commenced by others, to declare that there is a war and
thereupon to make provisions for waging war; to determine so
far as the nation can assert and enforce its will how long the
war shall continue, and when peace is restored . . .. The
rights of war do not necessarily terminate with the cessation
of actual hostilities. . . . It is for Congress, the department
of the national government to which the power to declare war is
entrusted by the Constitution, to determine when the war has
so far ended that this work can be safely and successfully com-
pleted."
Among the opponents of the Knox Resolution, Mr. Con-
nally 27 contended that the investure of power to deal with a
given subject matter in one department, excludes its exercise
by another. He thus concluded that peace can be established
only by treaty. Further he opposed the latitudinarian construc-
tion of the advocates of the Knox Resolution by arguing that in
case one branch of the government had authority to assume in
certain emergencies functions pertaining to another branch, it
would then be necessary for some authority to determine when
such emergency had arisen, and no provision is made for this
by the Constitution. He also pointed out that in the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787 the question was debated whether
Congress should have the power to make peace and it was decided
in the negative. This decision says Mir. Connally was the result
of mature deliberation and in harmony with the principle of
checks and balances.28
Mxr. Flood contended that the war with Germany did not
end by lapse or discontinuance, but by agreement and that the
Knox Resolution is not a mere declaration of peace, but an
international agreement and as such cannot be regulated by
Congress.29
The general theory underlying the Knox Resolution to the
effect that what Congress can pass it can repeal, has been vigor-
ously attacked by showing that this assumption fails to recognize
"Vol. 1, p, 63-5,
27April 9, 1920, Cong. Record, p. 5776.
U Ibid 5772.
"April 8, 1920, Cong. Record, P, 5870,
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the distinction between an act of legislation as such and a reso-
lution creating a status or condition. It has been pointed out
that Congress cannot in general repeal resolutions of the latter
class of which resolutions admitting states to the Union, incor-
porating territory and admitting nationals to citizenship are
examples.3 0
So much for the arguments pro and con on the Knox Reso-
lution. Altho the precedent has been set and a war has been
terminated by Congressional resolution, we believe that the
impartial scholar, after a study of the evidence must conclude
that our Constitution is at present vague and ambiguous on this
point. Theoretically Congress, thru its control of appropria-
tions, could bring about a situation which would virtually con-
stitute a termination of hostilities. It is our opinion that an
attempt to employ this indirect method of control would be
highly undesirable.
Believing as we do, that "it should be easier to get out of
war than into it," we favor an amendment which will specifically
give to Congress the power to terminate hostilities. It should
be noted however that the discretionary exercise of the power
to terminate hostilities involves two other considerations which
should not be left to implication especially when an affempt is
being made to clarify the Constitution. These considerations
are (1) The power to terminate hostilities is not identical with
the power to make peace. The latter requires the assent of
both sides, unless perhaps both antagonists mutually abandon
hostilities. To permit Congress to attach clauses or conditions
to its act terminating hostilities, which are to be accepted or
considered by the enemy, would constitute an invasion of the
treaty maling power.31  (2) The exercise of the discretionary
power to terminate hostilities necessarily implies the further
power of determining the aims and objects of the war.
We propose a formal amendment to the Constitution of the
United States which shall read as follows: "Congress shall
have the power to determine the aims and objects of a war and
to terminate hostilities. Congress, in terminating hostilities
shall not invade the treaty making power by attaching clauses
"Wright, p. 292, The Control of American Foreign Relations.
n See Senator C. S. Thomas' article, Central Law Journal, Vol. 92,
p. 144.
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and conditions to its act, to be accepted or considered by the
enemy.")
Personally we believe that the Congress under the present
Constitution has the power to determine the aims and objects
of a war. Pomeroy says, "The organic law nowhere prescribes
or limits the causes for which hostilities may be waged against
a foreign country. The causes of war it leaves to the discretion
and judgment of the legislature.3 2  Ordronaux declares that
"The general power to declare war, and the consequent right
to conduct it as long as the public interests may seem to re-
quire" is vested in Congress.3 3 Story says, "It should be dif-
ficult in a republic to declare war, but not to make peace. The
representatives of the people are to lay the taxes to support a
war, and therefore have a right to be consulted as to its propriety
and necessity.34 Henry Clay, in a speech at Lexington, Ken-
tacky, on November 30, 1847, sensed the issue when he said,
"Either Congress or the President must have the right of deter-
mining the objects for which a war shall be prosecuted. There
is no other alternative. If the President possesses it and may
prosecute it for objects against the will of Congress, where is
the difference between our free government and that of any
other nation which may be governed by an absolute Czar, Em-
peror or King."3 5
In opposition to these great authorities, we well remember
that Senator La Follette was condemned as a traitor and defeat-
ist when he suggested the desirability of a discussion of war
aims on the floor of the Senate. During the World War, the
dominant view seemed to be, that after war is declared, it must
be prosecuted to the bitter end as the President may direct, until
one side or the other is hopelessly beaten, with one man, the
President-in sole command of the destinies of the nation. Sena-
tor La Follette declared, in one of the greatest speeches that has
been delivered in the Senate in this generation, "It is said by
many persons for whose opinions I have a profound respect and
whose motives I know to be sincere that 'we are in this war
IIntroduction to the Constitutional Law of the U. S., 9th Ed., 1886,
p. 373.
Constitutional Legislation, p. 496.
Commentaries on the Constitution, 5th Ed. 1891, p. 92.Quoted in Senate Com. on Privileges and Elections in re La
Follette speech, 65 Cong. 1918, p. 79.
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and must go thru to the end.' That is true. But it is not true
that we must go thru to the end to accomplisk an undisclosed
purpose, or to reach an unknown goal."'30
The proposal advocated in this essay, if written into the
fundamental law will not only remove the present uncertainty,
the continuance of which can not be justified in a country living
under a written Constitution, but also it will vest in our most
broadly representative body a necessary power in the process
of democratizing our war-making machinery.
FORREST REVERE BLAcK.
College of ILw,
University of Kentucky.
Cong. Record, October 6, 1917.
